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INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been dramatic growth in treaty making since World War II: more than 44,000 
treaties were registered with the United Nations between 1945 and 2007.
1
 Meanwhile, with the 
rise of globalization, the boundary separating domestic from international law has become 
increasingly permeable. Consequently, states are making greater use of treaties to regulate 
activity that was previously regulated exclusively by domestic law. For example, under the 1993 
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption,
2
 eighty-three states have agreed to regulate child 
adoption on a transnational scale.
3
 Additionally, states are concluding greater numbers of treaties 
that protect the rights of private parties, including, for example, treaties related to international 
human rights law,
4
 international humanitarian law,
5
 and international refugee law.
6
 As a 
consequence of these three trends — growth in the number of treaties, increasing overlap 
between treaties and domestic law, and a growing emphasis on private rights — domestic courts 
are playing an increasingly prominent role in treaty application. 
 
Traditional scholarship on the domestic application of treaties has focused on the  
distinction between monist and dualist legal systems.
7
 Part One of this chapter explains that 
distinction: in brief, the monist-dualist divide hinges on the role of the legislative branch in 
incorporating and implementing treaties domestically. Although the monist-dualist framework 
helps illuminate important formal differences among states, Part One suggests that scholarly 
preoccupation with the formal distinction between monism and dualism tends to obscure key 
functional differences among states.  
 
Hence, the remainder of the chapter adopts a functional approach, focusing primarily on 
the role of domestic courts in promoting compliance with treaty obligations and protecting 
treaty-based private rights. Part Two explains the distinction between horizontal, vertical and 
transnational treaty provisions. Part Three addresses the functional distinction between 
nationalist and transnationalist approaches to judicial application of treaties. Part Four discusses 
the crucial role of domestic courts in promoting compliance with treaty obligations, especially 
transnational and vertical treaty obligations.  
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Director of the Center for Global Law and Policy, Santa Clara University School of Law. 
1
 See United Nations Treaty Series Cumulative Index <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/CumulativeIndexes.aspx> 
accessed 29 December 2010. In contrast, states concluded about 16,000 treaties during the nineteenth century. See 
John Fabian Witt, ‗Internationalism and the Dilemmas of Strategic Patriotism‘ (2006) 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 787, 791. 
2
 Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (adopted 29 May 
1993, entered into force 1 May 1995) 1870 UNTS 167. 
3
 See Status Table, Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69> accessed 29 December 2010. 
4
 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
5
 See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 
August 1949) 75 UNTS 135. 
6
 See, e.g., Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967) 606 UNTS 267. 
7
 See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
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The functional analysis in Parts Two to Four shows that domestic courts play a key role 
in protecting private rights under transnational treaty provisions and promoting compliance with 
those provisions, but they play virtually no role in promoting compliance with horizontal treaty 
provisions. This is generally true for both monist and dualist states. The story with respect to 
vertical treaty provisions is more complicated. When domestic courts adopt a transnationalist 
approach, they play a key role in protecting private rights under vertical treaty provisions and 
promoting compliance with those provisions. When domestic courts adopt a nationalist 
approach, vertical treaty provisions may be under-enforced. There does not appear to be any 
significant correlation between a state‘s formal classification as monist or dualist and the 
tendency of domestic courts in that state to function in a nationalist or transnationalist mode.   
 
I. 
Monism and Dualism 
 
The terms ‗monism‘ and ‗dualism‘ generate considerable confusion because there is no 
single, agreed definition of the terms. Some scholars employ the terms to describe contrasting 
theoretical perspectives on the relationship between international and domestic law.
8
 Used in this 
sense, dualism ‗points to the essential difference of international law and municipal law, 
consisting primarily in the fact that the two systems regulate different subject-matter‘.9 In 
contrast, monism holds that ‗international and municipal law are part of the same system of 
norms‘.10 Some monist theorists assert ‗the supremacy of international law‘ over domestic law, 
but this is not an essential feature of monist theory.
11
 
 
Other scholars employ the terms monism and dualism to describe different types of 
domestic legal systems.
12
 Used in this sense, dualist states are states in which ‗the constitution ... 
accords no special status to treaties; the rights and obligations created by them have no effect in 
domestic law unless legislation is in force to give effect to them‘.13 In contrast, ‗[t]he essence of 
the monist approach is that a treaty may, without legislation, become part of domestic law once it 
has been concluded in accordance with the constitution and has entered into force for the state‘.14 
As Professor Aust correctly notes, many national constitutions ‗contain both dualist and monist 
elements‘.15 
 
This chapter uses the terms monism and dualism in the second sense, to describe different 
types of domestic legal systems. Dualist states are states in which no treaties have the status of 
law in the domestic legal system; all treaties require implementing legislation to have domestic 
                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7
th
 edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 31–33. 
9
 ibid 31. 
10
 ibid 32. 
11
 See ibid 32–33 (discussing Kelsen‘s and Lauterpacht‘s theories). 
12
 See, e.g., Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 181–95. 
13
 ibid 187. 
14
 ibid 183. 
15
 ibid 182. 
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legal force.
16
 Monist states are states in which some treaties have the status of law in the 
domestic legal system, even in the absence of implementing legislation.
17
 In most monist states, 
there are some treaties that require implementing legislation and others that do not. There is 
substantial variation among monist states as to which treaties require implementing legislation. 
Moreover, monist states differ considerably in terms of the hierarchical rank of treaties within 
the domestic legal order. Despite these variations, all monist states have one common feature: at 
least some treaties have the status of law within the domestic legal order. 
  
The question whether a treaty requires legislative implementation after the treaty enters 
into force internationally must be distinguished from the question whether legislative approval is 
necessary prior to treaty ratification. In most dualist states, the executive has the constitutional 
authority to conclude treaties that bind the nation under international law without obtaining prior 
legislative approval.
18
 The executive‘s power to conclude treaties without prior legislative 
approval helps explain why, in dualist states, implementing legislation is necessary to grant 
treaties domestic legal force. In most monist states, though, the constitution requires legislative 
approval for at least some treaties before the executive can make an internationally binding 
commitment on behalf of the nation.
19
 The fact that the legislature approves (some) treaties 
before they become binding on the nation helps explain why, in monist states, some treaties have 
the status of domestic law even in the absence of implementing legislation. In sum, in both 
monist and dualist states, it is rare for a treaty to have domestic legal force unless the legislature 
has acted either to approve the treaty before international entry into force, or to implement the 
treaty after international entry into force.
20
  
 
The following sections summarize key features of monist and dualist systems. The 
analysis touches upon the domestic legal systems of twenty-one states, relying heavily on two 
previously published volumes that present a comparative analysis of national treaty law.
21
 Those 
twenty-one states include five dualist states: Australia, Canada, India, Israel and the United 
Kingdom. The other sixteen (monist) states are: Austria, Chile, China, Columbia, Egypt, France, 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, and 
the United States. 
 
A. Dualist States 
 
Almost all the British Commonwealth states follow the dualist approach for treaties.
22
 
Apart from Commonwealth states, Israel, Denmark and other Nordic states also follow a dualist 
                                                 
16
 In many dualist states, customary international law has domestic legal force, even in the absence of implementing 
legislation. See, e.g., Nihal Jayawickrama, ‗India‘ in David Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement: A Comparative Study (CUP, Cambridge 2009) 244–45. 
17
 These definitions arguably constitute a slight departure from standard terminology. However, these definitions 
have the advantage of drawing a clear distinction between monism and dualism. Applying these definitions, almost 
all states can be neatly classified as either monist or dualist, without any significant overlap between the categories. 
18
 See infra note 25. 
19
 See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
20
 See Duncan B. Hollis, ‗A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice‘ in Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. 
Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington (eds), National Treaty Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston 
2005) 32–45 [hereinafter National Treaty Law].  
21
 See National Treaty Law (n 20); Sloss (n 16). 
22
 See Aust (n 12) 194–95.  
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approach.
23
 The key distinguishing feature of dualism is that no treaties have the formal status of 
law in the domestic legal system unless the legislature enacts a statute to incorporate the treaty 
into domestic law.
24
 Such statutes must be distinguished from legislative acts that authorize the 
executive to make a binding international commitment. In dualist states, the executive typically 
has the constitutional authority to make a binding international commitment on behalf of the 
nation without obtaining prior legislative approval.
25
 However, in many dualist states the 
executive consults with the legislature before concluding ‗important‘ treaties.26 (There is 
considerable variation among states concerning which treaties qualify as ‗important‘.) Moreover, 
if legislation is needed to ensure that government officials have the requisite authority to 
implement a treaty, dualist states usually enact the necessary implementing legislation before the 
treaty enters into force internationally.
27
 
  
For courts in dualist states, there is a crucial distinction between incorporated and 
unincorporated treaties. As a formal matter, courts in dualist states have no authority to apply 
treaties directly as law. If the legislature has enacted a statute to incorporate a particular treaty 
provision into national law, courts apply the statute as law;
28
 they frequently consult the 
underlying treaty to help construe the meaning of the statute.
29
 Thus, in dualist states, courts 
apply treaties indirectly, not directly. However, one should not overstate the difference between 
direct and indirect application. In practice, courts can achieve roughly the same results, whether 
they apply the treaty directly or indirectly. Either way, judges who are receptive to the domestic 
judicial application of treaties can use their judicial power to protect the treaty-based rights of 
private parties and promote compliance with national treaty obligations.
30
 
      
Dualist states employ a variety of methods for incorporating treaties into national law.
31
 
In the United Kingdom, for example: the text of a treaty may be attached to a statute stipulating 
that the attached treaty provisions ‗shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom‘;32 
Parliament may pass an Act granting government officials ‗all the powers necessary to carry out 
                                                 
23
 See ibid. 
24
 See Donald R. Rothwell, ‗Australia‘ in Sloss (n 16) 128–30; Maurice Copithorne, ‗National Treaty Law and 
Practice: Canada‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 95–101; Dr. K. Thakore, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: India‘ 
in National Treaty Law (n 20) 351; Ruth Lapidoth, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Israel‘ in National Treaty 
Law (n 20) 396; and Sir Ian Sinclair, Susan J. Dickson and Graham Maciver, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: 
United Kingdom‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 733. 
25
 See Copithorne (n 24) 91–94 (Canada); Lapidoth (n 24) 385–90 (Israel); Rothwell (n 24) 128–30 (Australia); 
Sinclair and others (n 24) 727 (United Kingdom); and Thakore (n 24) 352–55 (India). 
26
 See Copithorne (n 24) 96, 98 (Canada); Lapidoth (n 24) 388–89, 393–94 (Israel); Sinclair and others (n 24) 737–
39 (United Kingdom); and Thakore (n 24) 365–66 (India). 
27
 See Copithorne (n 24) 96 (Canada); Lapidoth (n 24) 396–98 (Israel); Sinclair and others (n 24) 742 (United 
Kingdom); and Thakore (n 24) 359–60 (India). 
28
 See, e.g., Anthony Aust, ‗United Kingdom‘ in Sloss (n 16) 486; Rothwell (n 24) 138–41 (Australia); and Gib van 
Ert, ‗Canada‘ in Sloss (n 16) 202–04. 
29
 See, e.g., Aust (n 28) 482–83 (United Kingdom); Jayawickrama (n 16) 264–66 (India); David Kretzmer, ‗Israel‘ 
in Sloss, (n 16) 290–92 (Israel); Rothwell (n 24) 138–41 (Australia); and van Ert (n 28) 175–82 (Canada). 
30
 See generally David Sloss, ‗Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis‘ in Sloss (n 16) 8–
43 (analyzing the practice of national courts in eleven states). 
31
 See, e.g., Kretzmer (n 29) 283–85 (Israel); Rothwell (n 24) 159–60 (Australia); and van Ert (n 28) 169–71 
(Canada). 
32
 Aust (n 12) 189. 
5 
 
obligations under an existing or future treaties‘;33 or Parliament may pass an Act authorizing the 
Crown to enact regulations to implement one or more treaties.
34
 Given the wide variety of 
techniques that dualist states utilize to incorporate treaties,
35
 the question whether a particular 
treaty provision has been incorporated is often ambiguous.
36
  
 
The Australian High Court developed a creative approach to addressing this type of 
ambiguous situation, which commentators have dubbed ‗quasi-incorporation‘.37 The term refers 
to situations where ‗government departments, and administrative decision makers are given [a 
statutory directive] to take into account the provisions of ... international instruments to which 
Australia is a party‘.38 For example, in the Project Blue Sky case,39 an Australian statute 
specifically directed the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) ‗to perform its functions in a 
manner consistent with ―Australia‘s obligations under any ... agreement between Australia and a 
foreign country‖‘.40 The petitioners argued that the ABA had violated the statute by enacting 
regulations inconsistent with a bilateral free-trade agreement between Australia and New 
Zealand.
41
 A three-judge panel of the Federal Court held that ‗the ABA was not bound to take 
into account‘ the free-trade agreement because that agreement conflicted with a different 
statutory provision.
42
 The High Court reversed, holding ‗that the ABA was precluded from 
making a standard inconsistent with the‘ free-trade agreement, even though that agreement had 
not been directly incorporated into Australian domestic law.
43
 Courts in other dualist states have 
adopted a similar approach. In the United Kingdom, for example, petitioners in several cases 
have obtained judicial remedies by invoking statutes that required administrative decision 
makers to exercise their authority in conformity with treaty obligations that had not been directly 
incorporated into domestic law.
44
  
 
More surprisingly, courts in dualist states have developed a variety of strategies for 
judicial application of unincorporated treaties — even in the absence of any statutory directive 
                                                 
33
 ibid 190. 
34
 ibid 190–91. 
35
 See, e.g., Aust (n 28) 479–81 (United Kingdom) (discussing, among others, Cheng v Conn, Inspector of Taxes 
[1968] 1 All ER 779); Kretzmer (n 29) 283–85 (Israel); Rothwell (n 24) 158–60 (Australia) (discussing Project Blue 
Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Auth (1998) 153 ALR 490); and van Ert (n 28) 169–71 (Canada) (discussing, 
among othters, Pan American World Airways v The Queen [1981] 2 SCR 565; Schavernoch v Foreign Claims 
Commission [1982] 1 SCR 1092). 
36
 See, e.g., van Ert (n 28) 171 (stating ‗that the absence of formal rules on how treaties are implemented can create 
uncertainty about whether treaties have been implemented at all‘). 
37
 See Rothwell (n 24) 158–64. 
38
 ibid 159. 
39
 Project Blue Sky Inc. v Australian Broadcasting Auth. (1998) 153 ALR 490. 
40
 Rothwell (n 24) 141 (quoting Broadcasting Services Act 1992). 
41
 ibid 141–42. 
42
 ibid 143. 
43
 ibid 143–45. 
44
 See Aust (n 28) 490–91 (noting that ‗there have been numerous successful challenges by way of judicial review to 
[administrative] decisions on claims to refugee status‘); ibid 491–92 (discussing Secretary of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs v Quark Fishing Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1409; [2002] AER (D) 450 holding that the Director 
of Fisheries of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands ‗had not properly carried out his statutory powers‘ 
because he failed to take account of relevant treaty provisions). 
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for government officials to take account of treaty provisions.
45
 In Australia, for example, the 
High Court held in Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh
46
 that 
administrative decision makers must exercise their statutory discretion in conformity with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, an unincorporated treaty, because treaty ratification 
meant that individuals had a ‗legitimate expectation‘ that government officials would act in 
accordance with the treaty.
47
 The Canadian Supreme Court has declined to follow this so-called 
legitimate expectations doctrine.
48
 Even so, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that 
administrative decision makers in Canada, like their Australian counterparts, must exercise their 
statutory discretion in conformity with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, an 
unincorporated treaty.
49
 In Israel, ‗it has now become standard practice for the Supreme Court to‘ 
apply Geneva Convention IV in cases involving the Occupied Territories, although the 
Convention has not been incorporated into domestic law.
50
 The Court justifies this approach by 
citing the government‘s political commitment to ‗respect the humanitarian provisions of the 
Convention‘.51 Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court routinely applies unincorporated treaties to 
support its interpretation of both statutory and constitutional provisions;
52
 the Court has also 
applied treaties to support its progressive development of common law principles.
53
 
 
This increasing judicial reliance on unincorporated treaties by courts in dualist states 
blurs the traditional distinction between monist and dualist states.
54
 Nevertheless, judges in 
dualist states periodically invoke the dualist dogma that courts are powerless to apply treaties 
unless the legislature has expressly incorporated the treaty into domestic law.
55
 Hence, there 
remains an uneasy tension between the formalities of strict dualist doctrine and the practical 
reality that courts in dualist states have developed a variety of strategies to facilitate judicial 
application of unincorporated and partially incorporated treaties. 
 
B. Monist States 
 
                                                 
45
 See Michael P. Van Alstine, ‗The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: Summary and Conclusions‘ in 
Sloss (n 16) 608–12. 
46
 (1995) 128 ALR 353. 
47
 See Rothwell (n 24) 146–48 (quoting Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 
ALR 353). 
48
 See van Ert (n 28) 173 (discussing Baker v Canada (1999) 2 SCR 817). 
49
 See ibid 194–97 (discussing Baker v Canada (1999) 2 SCR 817). 
50
 See Kretzmer (n 29) 305–10 (discussing, among others, HCJ 3278/02, Hamoked The Center for the Defense of the 
Individual v IDF Commander 57 P.D. (1) 385). 
51
 ibid 309–10 (discussing HCJ 3278/02, Hamoked The Center for the Defense of the Individual v IDF Commander 
57 P.D. (1) 385; HCJ 7862/04, Abu Dahar v IDF Commander 59 P.D. (5) 368). 
52
 See Jayawickrama (n 16) 247–64 (discussing, among others, Jolly George Verhese v Bank of Cochin (1980) 2 
SCR 913; Transmission Coprporation of Andhra Pradesh v Ch. Prabhakar Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal 
6131 of 2002, 26 May 2004). 
53
 See ibid 255–56 (discussing MV Elisabeth v Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt Ltd [1992] 1 SCR 1003). 
54
 See Melissa A. Waters, ‗Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human 
Rights Treaties‘ (2007) 107 Colum. L. Rev. 628. 
55
 See, e.g., Ben Saul, ‗The Kafka-esque Case of Sheikh Manour Leghaei: The Denial of the International Human 
Right to a Fair Hearing in National Security Assessments and Migration Proceedings in Australia‘ (2010) Sydney 
Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/111 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701374> accessed 27 March 
2011.  
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The key distinguishing feature of monist legal systems, as defined herein, is that at least 
some treaties are incorporated into the domestic legal order without the need for any legislative 
act, other than the act authorizing the executive to conclude the treaty. Under this definition, 
Austria,
56
 Chile,
57
 China,
58
 Columbia,
59
 Egypt,
60
 France,
61
 Germany,
62
 Japan,
63
 Mexico,
64
 the 
Netherlands,
65
 Poland,
66
 Russia,
67
 South Africa,
68
 Switzerland,
69
 Thailand,
70
 and the United 
States
71
 all have monist legal systems. In all sixteen states, some form of legislative approval is 
required for at least some types of treaties before the executive is authorized to make a binding 
international commitment on behalf of the nation.
72
 Despite these similarities, there are 
substantial differences among these states concerning the application of treaties within their 
national legal systems. 
 
One significant area of variability concerns the types of treaties that require legislative 
approval before international entry into force of the treaty.
73
 In Mexico and Colombia, all treaties 
require prior legislative approval.
74
 Chile, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland 
establish a default rule that treaties ordinarily require legislative approval, but they recognize 
certain exceptions to that rule.
75
 In other states, legislative approval is required only for 
designated categories of treaties.
76
   
                                                 
56
 See Franz Cede & Gerhard Hafner, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Republic of Austria‘ in National Treaty 
Law (n 20) 59–60, 67–68. 
57
 See Francisco Orrego Vicuna & Francisco Orrego Bauzá, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Chile‘ in National 
Treaty Law (n 20) 136–38. 
58
 See Xue Hanqin, Hu Zhiqiang & Fan Kun, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: China‘ in National Treaty Law (n 
20) 163–64. 
59
 See Germán Cavelier, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Colombia‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 205. 
60
 See Nabil Elaraby, Mohammed Gomaa, & Lamia Mekhemar, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Egypt‘ in 
National Treaty Law (n 20) 238–39. 
61
 See Pierre Michel Eisemann & Raphaële Rivier, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: France‘ in National Treaty 
Law (n 20) 265–67. 
62
 See Dr. Hubert Beemelmans & Dr. Hans D. Treviranus, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of 
Germany‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 323–26. 
63
 See Takao Kawakami, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Japan‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 424–25. 
64
 See Dr. Luis Miguel Díaz, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Mexico‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 451. 
65
 See J.G. Brouwer, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: The Netherlands‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 497–99. 
66
 See Lech Garlicki, Malgorzata Masternak-Kubiak, & Krzysztof Wójtowicz, ‗Poland‘ in Sloss (n 16) 378. 
67
 See W.E. Butler, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Russia‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 554–56. 
68
 See N.J. Botha, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 600–02. 
69
 See Luzius Wildhaber, Adrian Scheidegger, & Marc D. Schinzel, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland‘ 
in National Treaty Law (n 20) 658–59. 
70
 See Sompong Sucharitkul, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: Thailand‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 706. 
71
 See Robert E. Dalton, ‗National Treaty Law and Practice: United States‘ in National Treaty Law (n 20) 788–90. 
72
 See Beemelmans & Treviranus (n 62) 323–26 (Germany); Botha (n 68) 590–92 (South Africa); Brouwer (n 65) 
489–91 (the Netherlands); Butler (n 67) 544–47 (Russia); Cavelier (n 59) 199 (Colombia); Cede & Hafner (n 56) 
64–65 (Austria); Dalton (n 71) 770–74 (United States); Díaz (n 64) 447–48 (Mexico); Eisemann & Rivier (n 61) 
258–60 (France); Elaraby and others (n 60) 231 (Egypt); Garlicki and others (n 66) 376–77 (Poland); Hanqin and 
others (n 58) 161–62 (China); Kawakami (n 63) 419–20 (Japan); Sucharitkul (n 70) 701–03 (Thailand); Vicuna & 
Bauzá (n 57) 127–30 (Chile); and Wildhaber and others (n 69) 644–48 (Switzerland). 
73
 For a tabular depiction of the variability in this area, see Hollis ‗Comparative Approach‘ (n 20) 33.  
74
 See Cavelier (n 59) 199 (Colombia); Díaz (n 64) 447–48 (Mexico). 
75
 See Botha (n 68) 586–92 (South Africa); Brouwer (n 65) 489–91 (the Netherlands); Vicuna & Bauzá (n 57) 123–
24 (Chile); and Wildhaber and others (n 69) 644–51 (Switzerland). 
76
 See Hollis, ‗Comparative Approach‘ (n 20) 32–37. 
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Another significant area of variability relates to publication requirements. In Egypt, 
France, Chile, Japan, and Russia, a treaty that has entered into force internationally lacks 
domestic legal force until the executive branch publishes or promulgates the treaty 
domestically.
77
 In other monist states, though, (at least some) treaties enter into force 
domestically at the same time they enter into force internationally, without the need for any 
additional steps.
78
 
 
There is also significant variation among monist states concerning the hierarchical rank 
of treaties within the domestic legal order. In Austria, Egypt, Germany, and the United States, 
treaties are equivalent to statutes; they rank lower than the Constitution.
79
 In South Africa, 
treaties rank lower than statutes.
80
 In China, France, Japan, Mexico, and Poland, (at least some) 
treaties rank higher than statutes but lower than the Constitution.
81
 In the Netherlands, some 
treaties rank higher than the Constitution.
82
 In Chile, Russia and Switzerland, the hierarchical 
rank of treaties is contested, but it is undisputed that at least some treaties rank higher than 
statutes,
83
 and there is some authority for the proposition that some treaties have constitutional 
rank.
84
 
 
In many monist states, even if a treaty has the formal status of law in the absence of 
implementing legislation, the legislature sometimes enacts legislation to help ensure that courts 
and executive officers give practical effect to the treaty within the national legal system. Thus, 
for example, the United States enacted implementing legislation for the New York Convention,
85
 
and South Africa enacted implementing legislation for the Warsaw Convention.
86
 As Professor 
                                                 
77
 See Butler (n 67) 552–54 (Russia); Eisemann & Rivier (n 61) 265–67 (France); Elaraby and others (n 60) 238–39 
(Egypt); Kawakami (n 63) 424–25 (Japan); Vicuna & Bauzá (n 57) 136–38 (Chile). 
78
 See Hollis, ‗Comparative Approach‘ (n 20) 41–42. 
79
 See Cede & Hafner (n 56) 59–60, 67–68 (Austria); Dalton (n 71) 789–90 (United States); Elaraby and others (n 
60) 238–39 (Egypt); Andreas L. Paulus, ‗Germany‘ in Sloss (n 16) 214–18. In both Austria and Germany, treaties 
approved by the legislature have the rank of statutes, but treaties concluded without legislative approval have a 
lower rank. See Cede & Hafner (n 56) 67–68; Paulus, ‗Germany‘ in Sloss (n 16) 214–18. In the United States, 
though, there is at least some authority for the proposition that treaties concluded without legislative approval have 
the same rank as treaties approved by the legislature. See United States v Pink 315 US 203, 62 S Ct 552 (1942); 
United States v Belmont 301 US 324, 57 S Ct 758 (1937). 
80
 This follows directly from Article 231(4) of the South African Constitution, which states: ‗Any international 
agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing 
provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament‘. 
81
 See Díaz (n 64) 451–54 (Mexico); Eisemann & Rivier (n 61) 263–67 (France); Garlicki and others (n 66) 376–79 
(Poland); Hanqin and others (n 58) 163–65 (China); and Timothy Webster, ‗International Human Rights Law in 
Japan: The View at Thirty‘ (2010) 23 Colum. J. Asian L. 241, 245. 
82
 See Brouwer (n 65) 498–99. 
83
 See Butler (n 67) 554–56 (Russia); Vicuna & Bauzá (n 57) 138–39 (Chile); and Wildhaber and others (n 69) 658–
64 (Switzerland). 
84
 See Butler (n 67) 556 (contending that ‗[t]he primacy of international treaties of the Russian Federation extends to 
Federal laws, including constitutional laws‘.); Vicuna & Bauzá (n 57) 139 (noting that, in one view, human rights 
treaties ‗now have in Chile a ranking above that of ordinary statutes and at least equal to the Constitution‘); and 
Wildhaber and others (n 69) 662 (Switzerland) (‗Treaties in conflict with federal constitutional law have to be 
applied irrespective of their unconstitutionality‘.). 
85
 See Federal Arbitration Act 1970 ss 201–08 (implementing the New York Convention). 
86
 See John Dugard, ‗South Africa‘ in Sloss (n 16) 470. 
9 
 
Nollkaemper observes: ‗[E]ven if the provisions of a treaty could in principle be applied directly, 
the Netherlands usually chooses to convert them into national legislation to harmonize Dutch law 
with the requirements of international law‘.87 
 
All monist states recognize the possibility, at least theoretically,
88
 that domestic courts 
can apply (at least some) treaties directly as law.
89
 Indeed, this is one of the crucial differences 
between monist and dualist systems: dualist states permit only indirect judicial application of 
treaties, whereas monist states permit direct judicial application in some cases. Despite this 
formal distinction, however, there are several reasons why judicial practice exhibits many 
similarities between monist and dualist states. First, as noted above, courts in dualist states apply 
various strategies to facilitate judicial application of unincorporated and partially incorporated 
treaties.
90
  
 
Second, courts in monist states often apply treaties indirectly as an aid to statutory or 
constitutional interpretation, rather than applying treaties directly as rules of decision to resolve 
disputed issues.
91
 It is difficult to measure the relative frequency of direct versus indirect 
application, but there is some evidence that courts even in monist states rely more heavily on 
indirect than direct application.
92
 Indeed, courts may prefer indirect application ‗in cases where 
the direct application of international law would conflict with national law‘ because ‗[c]ourts 
usually prefer a conciliatory solution over the acknowledgment and resolution of a conflict of 
law‘.93 Insofar as courts in monist states prefer indirect rather than direct application, this further 
erodes the practical significance of the traditional distinction between monist and dualist states. 
 
Finally, in certain monist states, courts have articulated a distinction between ―self-
executing‖ and ―non-self-executing‖ treaties.94 When domestic courts decide that a treaty is 
―non-self-executing,‖ they sometimes behave as if the treaty has not been incorporated into 
domestic law even though the treaty, as a formal matter, has the status of law within the domestic 
legal system.
95
 Thus, just as judicial practice in some dualist states blurs the monist-dualist 
divide by applying unincorporated treaties as if they were incorporated, judicial practice in some 
                                                 
87
 André Nollkaemper, ‗The Netherlands‘ in Sloss (n 16) 335. 
88
 The South African Constitution expressly contemplates a category of self-executing treaties, but South African 
courts have not yet held that any particular treaty is self-executing. See Dugard (n 86) 453–55. 
89
 See William E. Butler, ‗Russia‘ in Sloss (n 16) 410–11; Cede & Hafner (n 56) 69 (Austria); Dalton (n 71) 788–90 
(United States); Díaz (n 64) 454 (Mexico); Eisemann & Rivier (n 61) 265–70 (France); Elaraby and others (n 60) 
238–39 (Egypt); Garlicki and others (n 66) 400–04 (Poland); Hanqin and others (n 58) 163–65 (China); 
Nollkaemper (n 87) 341–48 (the Netherlands); Paulus (n 79) 209–12 (Germany); Vicuna & Bauzá (n 57) 136–39 
(Chile); Webster (n 81) 244–47 (Japan); and Wildhaber and others (n 69) 644–48 (Switzerland). 
90
 See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text. 
91
 See, e.g., Dugard (n 86) 457–63 (South Africa); Garlicki and others (n 66) 403–04 (Poland); Nollkaemper (n 87) 
348–51 (the Netherlands); Paulus (n 79) 209–10 (Germany); and David Sloss, ‗United States‘ in Sloss (n 16) 526–
27. 
92
 See, e.g., Garlicki and others (n 66) 404 (stating that ‗the most typical technique [in Poland] is that of 
coapplication of an international norm and a domestic norm‘). 
93
 Nollkaemper (n 87) 349. 
94
 See infra notes 161-77 and accompanying text. 
95
 In the United States, for example, courts behave as if non-self-executing treaties are unincorporated, even though 
the Constitution states expressly that ―all treaties‖ are ―the supreme Law of the Land.‖ See Sloss, ‗United States‘ (n 
91) 509–14, 527-29, 534-39. 
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monist states blurs the monist-dualist divide by handling formally incorporated treaties as if they 
were unincorporated.     
II. 
Horizontal, Transnational and Vertical Treaty Provisions 
 
To appreciate the role of domestic courts in treaty application, it is important to 
understand the nature of modern treaties. There is a widespread misconception that treaties focus 
exclusively, or almost exclusively, on regulating horizontal relations among states. This was 
never really true,
96
 and it is certainly not true in the twenty-first century. States conclude treaties 
to regulate three different types of relationships: horizontal relations between and among states, 
vertical relations between states and private actors (including natural persons and corporations), 
and transnational relations between private actors who interact across national boundaries.
97
 The 
role of domestic courts in applying treaties varies greatly depending on whether the treaty 
provision at issue is horizontal, vertical or transnational.
98
 
 
Domestic courts rarely apply treaties that regulate horizontal relationships among states. 
If one state believes that another state has violated a horizontal treaty obligation, the complainant 
might raise the issue in diplomatic negotiations, or perhaps file suit in an international tribunal, 
but it would be unusual for the complainant to file suit in a domestic court. Domestic courts 
typically dismiss cases in which private litigants file suit to resolve disputes that are properly 
characterized as horizontal disputes between states, because domestic courts generally lack the 
institutional competence to adjudicate such disputes. For example, a group of Serbian citizens 
sued the Dutch government in a domestic court in the Netherlands, alleging that the government 
violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter by supporting the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 
1999. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that plaintiffs were not entitled to invoke 
Article 2(4) in a Dutch court.
99
 U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall made a similar point 
two centuries ago. Speaking as a Member of Congress (before he was appointed to the Supreme 
Court), he asserted that a treaty-related claim falls within the scope of judicial competence where 
parties ‗come into court, who can be reached by its process, and bound by its power ... to which 
they are bound to submit‘.100 However, in a case where ‗[t]he parties were the two nations ... the 
demand is not a case for judicial cognizance‘101 because sovereign nations are generally not 
bound to submit to the power of domestic courts. 
 
In contrast to horizontal treaties, domestic courts routinely apply transnational treaty 
provisions that regulate cross-border relationships between private actors. Such treaties include, 
                                                 
96
 See, e.g., David Sloss, ‗When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights?‘ (2006) 45 Colum. J. Trans‘l  
L. 20, 51–91 (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court‘s application of vertical and transnational treaty provisions between 
1789 and 1838). 
97
 A separate category of treaties involves agreements between States and international organizations. Such treaties 
involve horizontal provisions (such as a nation‘s obligation to make financial contributions) and vertical provisions 
(such as immunities for employees of international organizations). Treaties between states and international 
organizations do not generally include transnational provisions. 
98
 In assessing whether a particular treaty provision is properly characterized as horizontal, vertical, or transnational, 
it is important to examine the specific provision at issue because a single treaty may contain a combination of 
horizontal, vertical and transnational provisions. 
99
 See Nollkaemper (n 87) 347.   
100
 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800). 
101
 ibid. 
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for example, the 1958 New York Convention,
102
 the 1999 Montreal Convention,
103
 and the 1980 
Hague Convention on Child Abduction.
104
 Although states negotiated and ratified these treaties, 
they are designed primarily to regulate cross-border relationships among private actors, not 
horizontal relationships among states. The New York Convention provides rules for recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards arising from transnational commercial activities. The 
Montreal Convention governs relationships between airlines and their customers: both 
passengers and shippers. The Hague Convention applies to child custody disputes in which one 
parent transports a child across national boundaries. For these and other transnational treaties, 
domestic courts play a vital role in ensuring that private actors behave in accordance with 
internationally agreed rules regulating cross-border activities. Indeed, domestic courts are 
arguably the primary enforcers of transnational treaty obligations because most international 
tribunals lack jurisdiction to adjudicate private disputes involving alleged infractions of 
transnational treaty provisions.
105
 Moreover, such disputes rarely have sufficient political 
salience to become the subject of interstate diplomacy. 
 
The preceding comments apply equally to monist and dualist states. Although there are 
significant formal distinctions between monist and dualist states (as discussed in Part One 
above), there are few, if any, functional distinctions. In both monist and dualist states, domestic 
courts rarely apply horizontal treaty provisions, but they routinely apply transnational treaty 
provisions.  
 
The most significant differences among states relate to the judicial application of vertical 
treaty provisions — provisions that regulate relations between states and private parties. 
Prominent examples of vertical treaty provisions include the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (which protects the civil and political rights of citizens in relation to their own 
governments)
106
 and the Refugee Protocol (which protects the rights of individuals who have 
fled persecution in their home countries to seek asylum in other countries).
107
 Domestic courts in 
both monist and dualist states apply vertical treaty provisions more frequently than they apply 
horizontal treaty provisions because, in most mature legal systems, domestic courts have an 
institutional responsibility to protect the rights of private parties, and vertical treaties (unlike 
horizontal treaties) create rights for private parties.  
 
Whereas both vertical and transnational treaty provisions implicate the rights of private 
parties — and therefore invite judicial application of treaties — vertical treaty provisions 
implicate the public functions of government in a way that is not true for transnational treaty 
                                                 
102
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958) 330 UNTS 
38. 
103
 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (adopted 28 May 1999) 2242 
UNTS 309. 
104
 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (adopted 25 October 1980) 1343 UNTS 89. 
105
 Arbitral panels established pursuant to bilateral investment treaties frequently adjudicate disputes between states 
and private corporations but – in contrast to international commercial arbitration – investment treaty arbitration 
typically involves vertical treaty provisions, not transnational treaty provisions. The International Court of Justice 
occasionally adjudicates disputes that originated as transnational, commercial disputes between private parties. See, 
e.g., Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium v Switzerland) ICJ 
Press Release 2009/36. However, these types of transnational, private disputes rarely give rise to ICJ jurisdiction.  
106
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 4). 
107
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (n 6). 
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provisions. For example, the Refugee Protocol regulates the public functions of government by 
creating legal (vertical) duties that the government owes to individuals who claim refugee status 
under the treaty. In contrast, the 1999 Montreal Convention
108
 regulates the cross-border 
commercial activities of airlines, including state-owned airlines, but it does not create significant 
new duties for governments in the exercise of traditional public functions.  
 
This distinction between vertical and transnational treaty provisions helps explain the 
distinction between nationalist and transnationalist approaches to the judicial application of 
treaties. ‗Transnationalist‘ decisions manifest a belief that the judiciary has an independent 
responsibility to ensure that domestic government officials act in accordance with international 
treaty obligations. ‗Nationalist‘ decisions manifest a belief that courts should not scrutinize too 
closely government conduct that is arguably inconsistent with international treaty obligations. In 
countries where courts adopt a more ―transnationalist‖ approach — such as South Africa109 and 
the Netherlands
110
 — domestic courts apply both vertical and transnational treaty provisions with 
equal vigor. However, in states where courts adopt a more ―nationalist‖ approach — such as the 
United States
111
 and Israel
112
 — domestic courts are hesitant to apply vertical treaty provisions, 
even though they routinely apply transnational provisions.
113
  
 
The contrast between nationalist and transnationalist approaches manifests different 
judicial attitudes about the relative weight assigned to two competing factors: the judicial 
responsibility to protect the rights of private parties and the judicial responsibility to refrain from 
interfering with public governmental functions.
114
 Transnationalist judges assign greater weight 
(implicitly, if not explicitly) to the judicial responsibility to protect the rights of private parties, 
including rights vis-à-vis government actors protected by vertical treaty provisions. Nationalist 
judges assign greater weight (again implicitly, if not explicitly) to the judicial responsibility to 
defer to the political branches‘ judgment about how best to interpret and apply vertical treaty 
provisions. It bears emphasis that the distinction between nationalist and transnationalist 
approaches is best conceptualized as a spectrum with multiple shades of gray, not a sharp line 
separating black and white. 
 
One might think that courts in monist states are more transnationalist and courts in dualist 
states are more nationalist. In fact, though, there is not any significant correlation along these 
lines. Courts in dualist states sometimes adopt a transnationalist approach and courts in monist 
states sometimes adopt a nationalist approach.
115
 Hence, the monist-dualist dichotomy cannot 
                                                 
108
 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (n 102). 
109
 See Dugard (n 86) 448–75. 
110
 See Nollkaemper (n 87) 326–69. 
111
 See Sloss, ‗United States‘ (n 91) 504–54. 
112
 See Kretzmer (n 29) 273–325. 
113
 For more detailed analysis, see Sloss, ‗Treaty Enforcement‘ (n 30) 1–60; see also Van Alstine (n 45) 555–613. 
114
 See Paul B. Stephan, ‗Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1946–2000‘ in David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, and 
William S. Dodge (eds), International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change (CUP, Cambridge 
2011) [hereinafter Intl Law in the U.S. Supreme Court] (discussing U.S. Supreme Court‘s reluctance to apply 
treaties in a manner that would constrain the executive branch in its exercise of public governmental functions). 
115
 No state is purely nationalist and no state is purely transnationalist. However, courts in some states have more 
nationalist tendencies and courts in other states have more transnationalist tendencies. See Sloss, ‗Treaty 
Enforcement‘ (n 30). To obtain more accurate information, a detailed, multi-state empirical study is needed. No such 
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explain variations among states in judicial decision-making in cases involving vertical treaty 
provisions. Rather, the extent to which domestic courts apply vertical treaty provisions is best 
explained by examining whether courts in a particular country are more inclined to adopt a 
nationalist or transnationalist approach. 
 
III. 
Nationalist and Transnationalist Approaches 
 
Part Three discusses nationalist and transnationalist techniques that courts apply, 
focusing primarily on cases in which litigants ask courts to apply vertical treaty provisions. The 
tension between nationalist and transnationalist approaches generally does not arise in cases 
involving horizontal treaty provisions because courts rarely apply horizontal treaty provisions. 
Similarly, the tension between nationalist and transnationalist approaches rarely arises in cases 
involving transnational treaty provisions: courts in both monist and dualist states routinely apply 
transnational treaty provisions without hesitation. 
 
The fact that the tension between nationalist and transnationalist approaches pertains 
primarily to vertical treaty provisions raises an additional point. Since vertical treaty provisions 
regulate relations between states and private parties, litigated cases typically pit a private party 
against a government actor. In some cases, the government invokes a vertical treaty provision to 
support the exercise of governmental power to regulate private conduct.
116
 More commonly, 
though, a private party invokes a vertical treaty provision as a constraint on government 
action.
117
 Despite the spread of democratization since the end of the Cold War, many states still 
lack a truly independent judiciary.
118
 In such states, transnationalism is not a viable option 
because judges lack the institutional authority to issue and enforce judgments constraining 
government conduct. In states that do have an independent judiciary, though, courts must still 
decide whether to apply treaties — much as they would apply constitutional, statutory, or 
common law — as a tool to constrain government action. Transnationalist judges apply treaties 
in precisely this way, whereas nationalist judges employ various rationales for refraining to apply 
treaties as a constraint on government action. This is the core feature of the distinction between 
nationalist and transnationalist approaches. 
                                                                                                                                                             
study has been done, but the present author has done an empirical study of nationalist and transnationalist trends in 
U.S. courts. See Sloss, ‗United States‘ (n 91). 
116
 For example, when the Security Council approved the transfer of Charles Taylor to the Netherlands to stand trial 
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the government of the Netherlands relied on the Security Council 
resolution, and therefore ultimately the U.N. Charter ‗to provide the proper legal basis in domestic law for the arrest 
and detention of Charles Taylor‘. Nollkaemper (n 87) 329–30. 
117
 See, e.g., Paulus (n 79) 234–35 (discussing decisions of German courts applying Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations) (discussing BGH, Beschluss v 7.11.2001 (Decision of 7 November 2001), 5 StR 
116/01). 
118
 The Polity IV Project is the best source of data for estimating the number of countries with independent 
judiciaries. The Polity IV Project rates 162 countries on a range of variables, one of which (xconst) ranks countries 
in terms of constraints on the executive branch. See Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2009: Dataset Users‘ Manual <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> accessed 26 
March 2011. According to the most recent data, there are 81 countries that score 6 or 7 on the xconst variable, 
meaning that there are significant constraints on the executive. This is a reasonably good proxy for determining 
whether a country has an independent judiciary. Thus, approximately half the countries in the world have 
independent judiciaries.  
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 The following analysis of nationalist and transnationalist techniques is divided into four 
sections: statutory interpretation, treaty interpretation, constitutional interpretation, and self-
execution. The first three sections address issues that are common to both monist and dualist 
states. The final section addresses issues that are unique to monist states.
119
 
 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
 
Courts in both monist and dualist states frequently apply an interpretive presumption that 
statutes should be construed in conformity with the nation‘s international legal obligations, 
including obligations derived from both treaties and customary international law. This 
interpretive presumption is sometimes called a ‗presumption of conformity‘ or a ‗presumption of 
compatibility‘.120 In the United States, the presumption is referred to as the ‗Charming Betsy 
canon‘.121 Labels aside, the presumption of conformity is probably the most widely used 
transnationalist tool. Courts in Australia,
122
 Canada,
123
 Germany,
124
 India,
125
 Israel,
126
 the 
Netherlands,
127
 Poland,
128
 South Africa,
129
 the United Kingdom,
130
 and the United States,
131
 
among other countries, have applied the presumption in cases involving vertical treaty provisions 
to help ensure that government conduct conforms to the nation‘s international treaty obligations. 
 
One recurring issue concerns the threshold conditions necessary to trigger application of 
the presumption. There is broad agreement that courts may apply the presumption in cases where 
the statute is facially ambiguous. The Supreme Court of Canada has gone further, holding that ‗it 
is reasonable to make reference to an international agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to 
                                                 
119
 For a comparable analysis of issues unique to dualist states, see supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text. 
120
 See, e.g., van Ert (n 28) 188–97 (discussing application of the presumption of conformity by Canadian courts in 
the context of, among others, R v Hape [2007] SCC 26); Kretzmer (n 29) 287–92 (discussing application of the 
presumption of compatibility by Israeli courts in the context of, among others, Cr. A. 5/51, Steinberg v Attorney 
General 5 P.D. 1061; HCJ 2599/00, Yated – Friendly Society of Downs Syndrome Children’s Parents v Ministry of 
Education 56 P.D. (5) 834). 
121
 The canon takes its name from an 1804 decision by Chief Justice Marshall. See Murray v Schooner Charming 
Betsy 6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). For an insightful analysis of the Supreme Court‘s application of the 
Charming Betsy canon in the late twentieth century, see Melissa A. Waters, ‗International Law as an Interpretive 
Tool in the Supreme Court, 1946–2000‘ in Intl Law in the U.S. Supreme Court (n 114). 
122
 See Rothwell (n 24) 152–56 (discussing, among others, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1).  
123
 See van Ert (n 28) 188–97 (discussing, among others, R v Hape [2007] SCC 26). 
124
 See Paulus (n 79) 209 (‗German courts are also bound to interpret domestic law, as far as possible, in a way that 
avoids the breach of international legal obligations‘.) (citing BVerfGE 74, 358 at 370). 
125
 See Jayawickrama (n 16) 247–51 (discussing, among others, Jolly George Verghese [1980] 2 SCR 913). 
126
 See Kretzmer (n 29) 287–92 (discussing, among others, HCJ 2599/00, Yated – Friendly Society of Downs 
Syndrom Children’s Parents v Ministry of Education 56 P.D. (5) 834). 
127
 See Nollkaemper (n 87) 348–51 (discussing, among others, Supreme Court, 27 May 2005, LJN AS7054). 
128
 See Garlicki and others (n 66) 404 (noting that ‗coapplication of an international norm and a domestic norm‘ is 
the most common technique for the judicial application of treaties in Poland). 
129
 See Dugard (n 86) 457 (noting that the South African Constitution requires courts, when interpreting legislation, 
to ‗prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law‘) (citing S v Basson 2005 (1) SALR 171 (CC)). 
130
 See Aust (n 28) 482–83 (discussing, among others, Garland v British Rail Engineering [1983] 2 AC 751). 
131
 See Sloss, ‗United States‘ (n 91) 526–27 (discussing, among others, Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy 6 US (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).  
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determine if there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation‘.132 Justice Kirby 
advocated a similar approach in Australia, arguing that courts should refer to international 
treaties ‗not only when there exists statutory ambiguity, but also where the construction of a 
statute would result in an interpretation contrary to international human rights standards‘.133 
However, the majority of the Australian High Court has rejected this approach, refusing ‗to 
endorse a wider role for treaties in statutory interpretation other than where the legislature has 
clearly envisaged such a role or where there exists a clear ambiguity on the face of the statute‘.134 
 
Judicial application of the presumption is clearly transnationalist, especially in cases 
where the statute is not facially ambiguous. In contrast, judges with a more nationalist orientation 
sometimes avoid application of the presumption by declaring that a statute is unambiguous in 
cases where litigants argue that the statute could reasonably be interpreted in conformity with 
international treaty obligations.
135
 It is likely that courts throughout the world decide numerous 
statutory interpretation cases where the presumption is not applied, even though it is potentially 
applicable, because litigants fail to raise a possible treaty argument, or courts decline to address 
the argument explicitly. It is difficult to perform a systematic analysis of judicial application of 
the presumption even in a single country because it is hard to identify cases in which courts do 
not mention potentially applicable treaty arguments.  
    
B. Treaty Interpretation 
 
Domestic courts in both monist and dualist states are frequently asked to interpret 
treaties. In dualist states, this situation commonly arises when the legislature enacts a statute that 
is expressly intended to implement a treaty.
136
 In monist states, courts sometimes interpret 
treaties when a litigant asks the court to apply a treaty directly, and sometimes when the treaty is 
applied indirectly. Regardless of the context in which treaty interpretation issues arise, courts 
have a choice whether to adopt a nationalist or transnationalist approach to treaty interpretation.  
 
Courts applying a transnationalist approach interpret treaties in accordance with the 
shared understanding of the parties. In accordance with this approach, transnationalist judges cite 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
137
 decisions of foreign courts
138
 and international 
                                                 
132
 National Corn Growers Association v Canada [1990] 2 SCR 1324, 1372–73. 
133
 See Rothwell (n 24) 153–54. 
134
 ibid 156. 
135
 See, e.g., Breard v Greene 523 US 371, 375–76, 118 S Ct 1352, 1354–55 (1998) (construing a federal statute to 
be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). 
136
 See, e.g., Aust (n 28) 482–83 (United Kingdom) (discussing, among others, Sidhu v British Airways [1997] 1 
AER 193); Jayawickrama (n 16) 264–65 (India) (discussing Dadu alias Tulsidas v State of Maharashtra Supreme 
Court of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) 169 of 1999, 12 October 2000); and van Ert (n 28) 177 (Canada) (discussing 
Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982). 
137
 See, e.g., Aust (n 28) 483 (United Kingdom) (discussing, among others, R v Lambert Justices, ex p Yusufu [1985] 
Times Law Reports 114); Garlicki and others (n 66) 387–89 (Poland) (discussing, among others, Decision of March 
9, 2004, I CK 410/03 (not published Lex 182080)); Nollkaemper (n 87) 360–62 (Netherlands) (discussing, among 
others, Supreme Court, State Secretary for Finance v X 21 February 2003, 36 NYIL 2005, 475); Rothwell (n 24) 
151–52 (Australia) (discussing, among others, Morrison v Peacock [2002] HCA 44); and van Ert (n 28) 175–82 
(Canada) (discussing, among others, Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 
SCR 982).  
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tribunals,
139
 and views adopted by non-judicial international bodies
140
 to support their 
interpretations of particular treaty provisions. In contrast, courts applying a nationalist approach 
emphasize that treaty interpretation is primarily an executive function, not a judicial function. 
Accordingly, courts applying a nationalist approach tend to defer to the executive branch on 
treaty interpretation issues.
141
 Deference to the executive branch often yields judicial opinions 
that give greater weight to unilateral national policy interests, and less weight to the shared, 
multilateral understanding that guides transnationalist interpretations. 
 
Available information, which is admittedly limited, indicates that the nationalist approach 
to treaty interpretation is a minority approach. The United States may be the only state where 
courts have adopted an explicit interpretive presumption favoring deference to the executive 
branch on treaty interpretation issues.
142
 In Israel, the Supreme Court has never adopted an 
express interpretive presumption of this type, but ‗in cases relating to the [Occupied Territories], 
for a long time, the Supreme Court in fact adopted the interpretation of [Geneva Convention IV] 
favored by the authorities‘.143 In contrast, Polish commentators assert: ‗For a court to treat 
executive branch views [on treaty interpretation issues] as dispositive would be incompatible 
with the principle of independence of the judicial branch, as understood under the Polish 
Constitution‘.144 The Polish view appears to be the dominant one. In most countries with 
independent judiciaries — including both monist and dualist states — domestic courts claim an 
                                                                                                                                                             
138
 See, e.g., Dugard (n 86) 470 (South Africa) (discussing, among others, Potgieter v British Airways 2005 (3) 
SALR 133 (C)); Kretzmer (n 29) 291–92 (Israel) (discussing, among others, F.H. 36/84, Teichner v Air France 41 
P.D. (1) 589);  Nollkaemper (n 87) 364–65 (Netherlands) (discussing, among others, Administrative Law Division of 
the Council of State, M.E.D. v State Secretary for Justice 6 November 1995, 28 NYIL 1997, 353); and van Ert (n 28) 
185–86 (Canada) (discussing, among others, Connaught Laboratories Ltd v British Airways (2002) 61 OR (3d) 2004 
(Ont. SCJ)). 
139
 See, e.g., Dugard (n 86) 466–70 (South Africa) (discussing, among others, Ferreria v Levin NO 1996 (1) SALR 
984 (CC)); Garlicki and others (n 66) 389–98 (Poland) (discussing, among others, Judgment of January 29, 2003, 
V.S.A. 1494/02 (ONSA 2004 nr 2, item 57)); Nollkaemper (n 87) 363–64 (Netherlands) (discussing, among others, 
H v Public Prosecutor Court of Appeal of The Hague, ILDC 636 (NL 2007)); Paulus (n 79) 223–35 (Germany) 
(discussing, among others, BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004)); and van Ert (n 28) 183–84 (Canada) (discussing, among 
others, Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 SCR 91). 
140
 See, e.g., Dugard (n 86) 466–70 (South Africa) (discussing, among others, Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 (I) SALR 46 (CC)); Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) 
SALR 721 (CC)); Jayawickrama (n 16) 257 (India) (discussing Visaka v State of Rajasthan [1997] 3 LRC 361); 
Kretzmer (n 29) 298–301 (Israel) (discussing, among others, HCJ 7029/95 New General Labor Federation v 
National Labor Court 51 P.D. (2) 63, 157);  and van Ert (n 28) 184–85 (Canada) (discussing, among others, 
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General) [2004] 1 SCR 76). 
141
 See, e.g., Sloss, ‗United States‘ (n 91) 524–25 (discussing, among others, El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tsui Yuan 
Tseng 525 US 155, 168 (1999)); Kretzmer (n 29) 292–95 (Israel) (discussing, among others, HCJ 785/87, Afu v IDF 
Commander 42(2) P.D. 4 (English tr 29 Intl Legal Materials 139 (1990)). 
142
 See, e.g., Medellin v Texas 552 US 491, 513, 128 S Ct 1346, 1361 (2008) (‗It is, moreover, well settled that the 
United States‘ interpretation of a treaty ―is entitled to great weight‖‘.). In other states, courts give conclusive weight 
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independent responsibility to construe treaties in accordance with the shared expectations of the 
parties, without giving undue weight to the unilateral views of their own governments.
145
 
 
A distinct interpretive issue concerns treaty-based protection for the rights of private 
parties. Transnationalist judges recognize that many treaties are designed to protect the rights of 
private parties. Accordingly, they interpret treaties in a manner that accords significant protection 
to treaty-based private rights.
146
 In contrast, nationalist judges sometimes apply a presumption 
that treaties ordinarily regulate horizontal relations between states, not vertical relations between 
states and private parties.
147
 Application of this presumption can lead nationalist courts to 
construe vertical treaty provisions as if they were horizontal provisions, thereby denying 
protection for treaty-based private rights. This strategy provides nationalist judges a convenient 
rationale for declining to apply treaty-based (vertical) constraints on governmental conduct.
148
 
 
The United States is the only state whose courts have adopted an explicit interpretive 
presumption that treaties do not create rights for private parties. Courts in other states approach 
the matter as a straightforward interpretive question, without adopting a presumption for or 
against private rights.
149
 If the treaty text, on its face, indicates that the parties intended to confer 
rights on private parties, domestic courts will typically enforce those rights, subject to constraints 
on judicial enforcement of unincorporated treaties in dualist states.
150
 
 
C. Constitutional Interpretation 
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Courts in both monist and dualist states apply treaties to help elucidate the meaning of 
constitutional provisions. South Africa and India are two leading examples of states where courts 
routinely invoke treaties and other provisions of international law in the context of constitutional 
interpretation.
151
 The South African Constitution states explicitly: ‗When interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ... must consider international law; and may consider foreign 
law‘.152 In light of this constitutional mandate, the South African Constitutional Court has 
adopted the view ‗that the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights ... are inextricably linked 
to international law and the values and approaches of the international community‘.153 Similarly, 
the Indian Constitution stipulates: ‗The State shall endeavour to ... foster respect for international 
law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another‘.154 
Accordingly, Indian jurisprudence reflects a view ‗that any international convention not 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution and in harmony with its 
spirit must be read into those provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof‘.155  
 
Courts in Canada, Germany, Israel and Poland also apply treaties to help interpret 
domestic constitutional provisions, but they do so less regularly than the Indian Supreme Court 
or the South African Constitutional Court.
156
 The judicial practice of using international law in 
constitutional interpretation has provoked sharp controversy in both Australia and the United 
States. In Australia, Justice Kirby was a strong advocate for judicial application of international 
law in constitutional interpretation, but he never persuaded a majority of the High Court to 
follow his recommended approach.
157
 The United States Supreme Court has occasionally cited 
treaties to support its interpretation of a contested constitutional provision; in all such cases the 
majority‘s reliance on international law provoked a strong critical response from the dissenting 
Justices.
158
 
 
Recent judicial practice in the United Kingdom merits separate discussion. Since Britain 
does not have a written, constitutional Bill of Rights, British courts rely on other sources of law 
to protect the fundamental rights that, in most other countries, are protected by a written 
Constitution. The Human Rights Act, enacted in 1998, ‗effectively incorporated the [European 
Convention of Human Rights] into English law‘.159 Since passage of the Act, British courts 
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routinely apply the European Convention to protect individual rights that, in many other 
countries, would be regarded as constitutional rights.
160
 
 
D. Self-Execution in Monist States 
 
Judicial doctrine in monist states distinguishes between treaties that are directly 
applicable as law and treaties that are not directly applicable. Many states use the terms ‗self-
executing‘ and ‗non-self-executing‘ to distinguish between these two classes of treaty 
provisions.
161
 When a court holds that a treaty is self-executing, it typically acts in a 
transnationalist mode to facilitate the domestic application of treaty-based international norms. 
When a court holds that a treaty is not self-executing, it generally acts in a nationalist mode to 
shield the domestic legal system from the influence of treaty-based legal norms.
162
 Judicial 
doctrine invariably grants judges some discretion to determine which treaties are self-executing. 
Transnationalist judges exercise their discretion in a manner that pushes more treaties into the 
self-executing category. Nationalist judges exercise their discretion in a manner that pushes more 
treaties into the non-self-executing category. 
 
South Africa‘s Constitution includes an explicit textual distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaty provisions.
163
 Although the Constitution refers explicitly 
to ‗self-executing‘ treaties, it does not define the term ‗self-executing‘, nor does it identify 
criteria for distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. The South 
African courts have not yet issued a definitive ruling to clarify the meaning of the self-execution 
clause in the South African Constitution.
164
 Accordingly, there is an ongoing scholarly debate as 
to which treaties, if any, are self-executing in South Africa.
165
 Ultimately, the resolution of that 
question may have little practical significance because the South African Constitutional Court is 
one of the most transnationalist courts in the world: it regularly applies treaties and customary 
international law to help construe both statutory and constitutional provisions.
166
 
 
Domestic courts in Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands are also fairly transnationalist, 
insofar as they take a fairly broad view of which treaties are self-executing. In all three countries, 
courts generally hold that treaty provisions designed to benefit private parties are invocable by 
private parties and directly applicable by the courts, subject to one caveat.
167
 To be directly 
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applicable, ‗a treaty provision has to be sufficiently clear to function as ‗objective law‘ in the 
domestic legal order‘.168 Courts in all three countries have stated or assumed that most 
substantive provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and other human rights 
treaties are self-executing.
169
  
 
The self-execution jurisprudence in Germany, Poland and the Netherlands is 
characteristic of most European Union countries because judicial decision-making in those 
countries is heavily influenced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). ECJ case law 
―establishes that European law requires the direct effect of community law in the domestic legal 
order. Moreover, the ECJ demands supremacy of European over domestic law.‖170 Thus, once a 
legal instrument ―has been adopted by a competent EU body, it . . . becomes automatically 
incorporated into the system of law binding on the national level [in Poland] and must be 
enforced by all national authorities, in particular by the national courts.‖171 For states who are 
members of the European Union, this is a ―consequence of EU membership,‖ and member states 
have ―no alternative but to follow the established rules.‖172  
 
In contrast to European jurisprudence, self-execution doctrine in the United States is 
analytically incoherent.
173
 Courts and commentators agree that non-self-executing treaties are not 
directly applicable by domestic courts, but they do not agree why this is so. Some sources 
suggest that non-self-executing treaties are not incorporated into domestic law. A distinct view 
holds that non-self-executing treaties are part of domestic law, but they are a special type of law 
that courts are precluded from applying directly.
174
 Under the latter approach, there is further 
disagreement as to why courts are precluded from applying non-self-executing treaties.
175
 In 
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practice, courts often hold that treaties are non-self-executing when an individual invokes a 
vertical treaty provision as a constraint on government action, but they almost never hold that 
transnational treaty provisions are non-self-executing.
176
 Thus, the net effect of judicial doctrine 
is that U.S. courts tend to adopt a transnationalist approach in cases involving transnational treaty 
provisions, but they tend to adopt a nationalist approach in cases involving vertical treaty 
provisions.
177
 In contrast, courts in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and South Africa adopt a 
fairly consistent transnationalist approach for both vertical and transnational treaty provisions. 
 
IV. 
Domestic Courts and Treaty Compliance 
 
The final part of this chapter addresses the respective roles of the judicial, executive and 
legislative branches in promoting compliance with treaty obligations.
178
 My central claim is that 
these roles vary greatly depending on whether the treaty provision at issue is horizontal, vertical 
or transnational. In brief, executive officials have primary responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with horizontal treaty obligations; the judiciary‘s role is marginal. With respect to transnational 
treaty provisions, though, the positions are reversed. The judiciary plays a central role in 
promoting compliance with transnational treaty provisions and the executive is marginalized. 
The picture for vertical treaty provisions is more complex. 
 
A. Horizontal Treaty Provisions 
 
As discussed above, domestic courts rarely apply horizontal treaty provisions.
179
 
Consequently, domestic courts bear little responsibility for promoting compliance with 
horizontal treaty provisions. This proposition is generally true for both monist and dualist states, 
regardless of whether courts adopt a nationalist or transnationalist approach. 
 
With respect to horizontal treaties, the relationship between the legislative and executive 
branches depends on the specific treaty provision at issue and the constitutional structure of a 
given state. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty obligates parties to assist other member states 
if there is ‗an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America‘.180 The 
duty to provide mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack is a paradigmatic horizontal 
treaty obligation. If a NATO state was the target of an armed attack, the executive branches in 
other NATO states would have primary responsibility for providing assistance under the treaty. 
In some states, depending on constitutional separation of powers considerations, the executive 
might have to obtain legislative approval before committing troops and weapons to the defense 
of an ally. Regardless, there is no state in which the judiciary would be responsible for 
implementing the nation‘s treaty obligation to help defend against an armed attack.  
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B. Transnational Treaty Provisions 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that the executive branch has primary responsibility in most 
countries for implementing international treaty obligations. This is certainly not true for 
transnational treaty provisions. Consider, for example, the 1929 Warsaw Convention, which 
regulates international air carriage.
181
 In the United States, Congress never enacted legislation to 
implement the Convention, but courts routinely apply it as a self-executing treaty.
182
 In many 
dualist states,
183
 and even in some monist states,
184
 the legislature has enacted legislation to 
promote effective implementation of the Convention. In all states — whether the treaty is 
considered self-executing or is implemented by legislation — the judiciary bears primary 
responsibility for resolving disputes between private parties that are governed by the 
Convention.
185
 In the United States, the executive branch occasionally submits amicus briefs to 
present its views about the proper interpretation of contested treaty provisions, but that is the 
extent of executive branch participation in treaty implementation. 
  
Domestic courts play a crucial role in promoting compliance with transnational treaty 
provisions. A simple example helps illustrate this point. The New York Convention obligates 
states to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards.
186
 Assume that a French company and a 
Japanese company submit a commercial dispute to an arbitral panel in accordance with 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules.
187
 The panel orders the Japanese company to pay damages to the 
French company, but the Japanese company refuses to pay. That refusal, by itself, does not 
constitute a violation of Japanese treaty obligations because the company‘s refusal to pay is not 
attributable to the Japanese government.
188
 Now assume that the French company files suit in a 
Japanese court to enforce the arbitral award. If the Japanese court rules against the French 
company, and that ruling cannot be justified under the New York Convention,
189
 the judicial 
decision would constitute a violation of Japanese treaty obligations because that judicial decision 
is attributable to the Japanese government under principles of state responsibility.
190
 Conversely, 
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if the Japanese court orders the Japanese company to pay — and especially if the court attaches 
company assets to secure payment — the court is effectively acting as an agent of the 
international legal system to ensure Japanese compliance with national treaty obligations. Either 
way, the domestic court is the primary decision-maker whose decision determines whether the 
nation complies with its treaty obligations. This is characteristic of transnational treaty 
provisions: in most cases involving transnational provisions, domestic courts serve as the 
primary interface between the domestic and international legal systems, and their decisions 
effectively determine whether the nation complies with its treaty obligations.  
 
The preceding observations about domestic judicial application of transnational treaty 
provisions apply equally to both monist and dualist states, with one caveat. In dualist states, the 
legislature typically incorporates a treaty before courts will apply it to resolve private disputes. 
Once the treaty is incorporated, though, judicial application is quite similar in both monist and 
dualist states. Moreover, the distinction between nationalist and transnationalist approaches has 
scant effect on judicial application of transnational treaty provisions. The global record of 
compliance with transnational treaty provisions is quite good because national courts in most 
states apply transnational treaty provisions routinely — either directly or indirectly — to help 
resolve private disputes arising from cross-border activities. 
 
C. Vertical Treaty Provisions 
 
The relationship among the legislative, executive and judicial branches in implementing 
vertical treaty provisions is a complex subject that defies simple generalizations. Patterns vary by 
nation and by individual treaty. 
 
States sometimes achieve compliance with vertical treaty obligations even if no 
government official or agency makes a conscious decision to implement that obligation. For 
example, when the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the executive branch assured the Senate that no implementing legislation was 
necessary because the United States could fulfill its treaty obligations by applying pre-existing 
laws.
191
 Thus, when a court issues an injunction to enjoin enforcement of a state law that violates 
federal laws prohibiting race-based discrimination, one could say that the court is promoting 
compliance with U.S. treaty obligations under articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR,
192
 even if the court 
never considers a treaty-based argument. Similarly, commentators have noted that Canadian 
courts implement Canada‘s obligations under the ICCPR, at least partially, by applying the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other provisions of domestic law.
193
 
 
Leaving aside cases where states achieve compliance almost unwittingly, we turn next to 
situations where some government actor makes a conscious decision to apply or interpret a 
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particular treaty in a particular way. Here, it is helpful to discuss the 1951 Refugee Convention
194
 
and the 1967 Refugee Protocol
195
 to illustrate the interplay among the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches in the domestic application of vertical treaty provisions.    
 
In dualist states, the legislature must first decide whether to enact legislation to 
incorporate a treaty into domestic law. Professor Aust says: ‗It is invariable British practice 
never to ratify a treaty until any [necessary implementing] legislation has first been made‘.196 
Like Britain, other dualist states generally refrain from ratifying treaties with vertical obligations 
unless or until they have enacted the implementing legislation necessary to ensure compliance 
with those obligations.
197
 Accordingly, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have all 
adopted legislation to implement the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
198
 Even in monist states, 
legislatures often enact implementing legislation to promote effective domestic implementation 
of vertical treaty provisions. Although South Africa‘s Constitution provides expressly for self-
executing treaties,
199
 the South African legislature enacted legislation in 1998 to implement the 
nation‘s treaty obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol.200 Similarly, in the 
United States, even though the Constitution specifies that ratified treaties are the ‗supreme Law 
of the Land‘,201 Congress enacted legislation in 1980 to implement U.S. obligations under the 
Refugee Protocol.
202
 Thus, in both monist and dualist states, legislative decisions about whether 
and how to implement vertical treaty provisions can have a significant impact on the nation‘s 
compliance with its treaty obligations. 
 
Once a vertical treaty provision enters into force domestically, the executive branch 
assumes primary responsibility for treaty implementation. In most states, if an individual seeks 
admission to the country as a refugee, an executive officer will make the initial determination 
whether the individual qualifies for refugee status. That determination might promote or hinder 
treaty compliance, depending on three factors: 1) whether the treaty has been fully or partially 
incorporated into domestic law (either by legislation or self-execution); 2) insofar as the treaty is 
unincorporated or partially incorporated, whether the executive decision-maker construes 
relevant domestic laws in conformity with the nation‘s treaty obligations; and 3) insofar as the 
decision-maker consults or applies the treaty, whether that decision-maker interprets the treaty in 
accordance with internationally agreed principles of treaty interpretation. 
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If a treaty has been fully incorporated into domestic law — either by self-execution or by 
legislative incorporation — the decision-maker will presumably apply the treaty as a rule of law 
to reach his/her decision. In the Netherlands, for example, the 2000 Aliens Act authorizes 
executive officers to grant residence permits for ‗Convention refugees‘, without defining the 
term. Hence, the statute effectively directs administrative (and judicial) decision makers to apply 
the treaty definition of refugees.
203
 The statute therefore promotes treaty compliance by directing 
decision-makers to apply the treaty definition as a rule of domestic law. In contrast, when a 
treaty remains wholly or partially unincorporated, decision-makers must apply domestic rules in 
place of or in tandem with the international rule; this raises a greater risk of noncompliance. In 
Australia, for example, the 1951 Convention has been only partially incorporated into domestic 
law.
204
 Consequently, Australian decision-makers have been hesitant to rely too heavily on the 
Convention in construing domestic statutes,
205
 producing a less-than-perfect record of treaty 
compliance. 
 
If a vertical treaty provision remains wholly or partially unincorporated, executive 
decision-makers might still construe relevant domestic statutes in harmony with the nation‘s 
international treaty obligations. For example, Canada‘s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
directs executive officers to construe the Act ‗in a manner that ... complies with international 
human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory‘.206 The statutory reference to ―human 
rights instruments‖ presumably includes the Refugee Convention and Protocol.207 Similarly, in 
other states, executive officers may have a constitutional or statutory duty to perform their 
governmental functions in a manner that is consistent with the nation‘s treaty obligations — 
including, perhaps, obligations contained in unincorporated or partially incorporated treaties.
208
 
Alternatively, executive officials might simply decide as a policy matter to exercise their 
statutory responsibilities in a way that promotes compliance with treaty obligations. In any case, 
if executive officials have a conscious goal of exercising their powers and duties consistently 
with international treaty obligations, treaty compliance is enhanced. Conversely, if executive 
officials are heedless of treaty obligations, their actions are less likely to promote treaty 
compliance. 
 
Executive officials are often required to interpret treaties. An official charged with 
deciding whether to grant an applicant refugee status would need to interpret the treaty if the 
treaty itself provides the governing rule of domestic law (via self-execution or full 
incorporation), or if some law or policy directs the official to take account of the treaty when 
construing the relevant domestic statute. In construing the treaty, the official might be guided to 
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some extent by unilateral national policy interests. However, he or she might also be guided by 
internationally agreed principles of treaty interpretation.
209
 If executive decision-makers give 
great weight to internationally agreed principles, their decisions are more likely to promote treaty 
compliance. Conversely, if decision-makers give more weight to unilateral policy interests, there 
is a greater risk that their decisions will obstruct treaty compliance. 
 
If the legislative and executive branches both viewed treaty compliance as a paramount 
objective, the courts would rarely be asked to decide cases involving alleged treaty violations. 
However, legislatures sometimes fail to implement treaties that require legislative 
implementation, and executive officers sometimes fail to honor such treaties. When that happens, 
courts may be asked to decide whether governmental conduct is consistent with the nation‘s 
treaty obligations. Ultimately, the impact of judicial decision-making depends heavily on 
whether domestic courts pursue a nationalist or transnationalist course. In states where courts 
tend to adopt a transnationalist approach, domestic courts can play a key role in promoting treaty 
compliance. India, the Netherlands, and Poland are leading examples of states where domestic 
courts actively promote compliance with vertical treaty obligations.
210
 However, in states where 
courts tend to apply a nationalist approach, domestic courts effectively cede authority to the 
legislative and executive branches to make key decisions affecting compliance with vertical 
treaty provisions. Israel and the United States exemplify this nationalist approach, although 
judicial decision-making in Israel is moving in a more transnationalist direction.
211
 
 
Finally, it is important to note that legislative action or inaction can nudge courts in a 
more nationalist or transnationalist direction. In the United Kingdom, for example, Parliament‘s 
decision to enact the Human Rights Act 1998 has undoubtedly moved judicial decision-making 
in British courts in a more transnationalist direction.
212
 In the United States, however, the 
Senate‘s consistent practice of attaching non-self-executing declarations to human rights treaties 
has clearly pushed judicial decision-making in a more nationalist direction.
213
 These examples 
illustrate the complexity of the relationship among legislative, executive and judicial branches in 
shaping governmental decisions that affect compliance with vertical treaty obligations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
International law and international relations scholars have written extensively about 
theories of national compliance with international legal obligations, including treaty 
obligations.
214
 However, the scholarly literature has paid scant attention to domestic courts as 
key institutional actors whose decisions can promote or impede treaty compliance.
215
 The 
preceding discussion suggests that more detailed study of domestic courts is warranted. Granted, 
                                                 
209
 Add citation to Richard Gardiner‘s chapter. 
210
 See Garlicki and others (n 66) (Poland); Jayawickrama (n 16) (India); and Nollkaemper (n 87) (the Netherlands). 
211
 See Kretzmer (n 29) (Israel); Sloss ‗United States‘ (n 91). 
212
 See Aust (n 28) 483–84, 487–90. 
213
 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, ‗Global Power in an Age of Rights: Historical Commentary, 1946–2000‘ in Intl 
Law in the U.S. Supreme Court (n 114). 
214
 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2005); Andrew T. 
Guzmán, How International Law Works (OUP, Oxford 2008); and Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, ‗How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law‘ (2004) 54 Duke L.J. 621. 
215
 But see Harold Hongju Koh, ‗Why Do Nations Obey International Law?‘ (1997) 106 Yale L. J. 2599. 
27 
 
domestic judicial decisions have little impact on national compliance with horizontal treaty 
obligations. However, domestic courts play a central role in ensuring compliance with 
transnational treaty obligations. Moreover, domestic courts have the potential to play a very 
significant role in promoting compliance with vertical treaty obligations. Whether that potential 
is realized depends, to a great extent, on whether domestic courts adopt a nationalist or 
transnationalist approach to the judicial application of vertical treaty provisions. 
 
 
